Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004) [4 pages]

Quantum Cryptography Protocols Robust against Photon Number Splitting Attacks for Weak Laser Pulse Implementations

Abstract

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Valerio Scarani¹, Antonio Acín¹, Grégoire Ribordy², and Nicolas Gisin¹
¹Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, 20, rue de l’Ecole-de-Médecine, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland
²Id-Quantique, rue Cingria 10, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland

Received 22 November 2002; published 6 February 2004

We introduce a new class of quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS attacks at zero error.

URL:

http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.057901

DOI:

10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.057901

PACS:

03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk

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Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004) [4 pages]

Quantum Cryptography Protocols Robust against Photon Number Splitting Attacks for Weak Laser Pulse Implementations