Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005) [4 pages]Beating the Photon-Number-Splitting Attack in Practical Quantum CryptographyReceived 14 October 2004; published 16 June 2005 We propose an efficient method to verify the upper bound of the fraction of counts caused by multiphoton pulses in practical quantum key distribution using weak coherent light, given whatever type of Eve’s action. The protocol simply uses two coherent states for the signal pulses and vacuum for the decoy pulse. Our verified upper bound is sufficiently tight for quantum key distribution with a very lossy channel, in both the asymptotic and nonasymptotic case. So far our protocol is the only decoy-state protocol that works efficiently for currently existing setups. © 2005 The American Physical Society URL:
http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.230503
DOI:
10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.230503
PACS:
03.67.Dd
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