Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010503 (2007) [4 pages]Long-Distance Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution in Optical FiberReceived 26 July 2006; published 5 January 2007 The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultralow-noise, high-efficiency transition-edge sensor photodetectors, we have implemented the first version of a decoy-state protocol that incorporates finite statistics without the use of Gaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling the creation of secure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to Trojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber. © 2007 The American Physical Society URL:
http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.010503
DOI:
10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.010503
PACS:
03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.79.Sz, 85.25.Oj
See AlsoSee Also: Cheng-Zhi Peng, Jun Zhang, Dong Yang, Wei-Bo Gao, Huai-Xin Ma, Hao Yin, He-Ping Zeng, Tao Yang, Xiang-Bin Wang, and Jian-Wei Pan, Experimental Long-Distance Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution Based on Polarization Encoding, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010505 (2007). See Also: Tobias Schmitt-Manderbach, Henning Weier, Martin Fürst, Rupert Ursin, Felix Tiefenbacher, Thomas Scheidl, Josep Perdigues, Zoran Sodnik, Christian Kurtsiefer, John G. Rarity, Anton Zeilinger, and Harald Weinfurter, Experimental Demonstration of Free-Space Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution over 144 km, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010504 (2007). |
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